— The cybercrime agency must clearly define what it means by ‘fake news’ and ‘anti-state propaganda’, disclose the legal basis of its cyber-patrolling units and establish safeguards against politically motivated surveillance
By Irum Saleem
The new leadership of the National Cybercrime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) has announced a “zero-tolerance policy” against fake news and what it describes as anti-state propaganda. While combating malicious disinformation is a legitimate responsibility of any modern state, the announcement raises an important question: where does the fight against harmful online content end and the policing of political opinion begin?
The distinction is crucial because neither “fake news” nor “anti-state propaganda” is sufficiently precise in ordinary usage. Without clear definitions, transparent procedures and meaningful oversight, such broad expressions can potentially be used against legitimate criticism, dissent and political speech.
The NCCIA has an important and clearly identifiable role to perform. Cyber fraud, online harassment, blackmail, identity theft, financial scams and organised digital crime are increasingly affecting ordinary citizens. The agency’s recent action against fraudulent call centres demonstrates the kind of work that can directly protect people and strengthen public confidence in the institution.
But monitoring citizens’ opinions is fundamentally different from investigating cybercrime.
The reported establishment of cyber-patrolling units across the country therefore deserves much greater public explanation. What exactly will these units monitor? Will they identify criminal activity, or will they routinely scan citizens’ social-media posts? What legal authority will govern such surveillance? What safeguards will prevent the collection or misuse of personal information? And, perhaps most importantly, who will independently oversee these powers?
These are not merely technical questions.
They concern the fundamental relationship between the citizen and the state in an increasingly digital society.
Pakistan’s experience with cybercrime legislation makes the issue even more sensitive.
The 2025 amendments to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (Peca), which introduced criminal penalties relating to the dissemination of what the law describes as false information, were strongly criticised by journalists, civil-society organisations and rights groups. Concerns were raised that vaguely worded provisions could be used to suppress legitimate journalism and political expression.
Against that backdrop, the creation of specialised cyber-patrolling units and the NCCIA’s emphasis on fake news and anti-state propaganda inevitably invite scrutiny.
The timing is particularly significant.
The announcement comes at a moment of heightened political tension, with the government and opposition locked in a dispute over protests and political demands. In such an environment, even an otherwise legitimate law-enforcement initiative can acquire a political colour if its powers are exercised selectively.
The danger, therefore, is not only what the NCCIA actually does but also what citizens believe it is empowered to do.
If journalists, political activists and ordinary social-media users begin to believe that criticism of the government, state institutions or public policy could trigger a cybercrime investigation, the chilling effect on free expression could be considerable.
That perception must be avoided.
The NCCIA director general has spoken of merit, transparency and professional standards. The public should now be told, in clear terms, how these principles will apply to cyber patrolling. The agency should publish its operational guidelines, identify the legal basis for surveillance, explain the threshold for initiating investigations and establish mechanisms through which citizens can challenge misuse of authority.
There should also be a clear firewall between criminal investigation and political expression.
A citizen criticising a government policy, a journalist questioning an official narrative or a political party accusing the state of wrongdoing should not automatically be placed in the same category as someone running a fraud network, extorting victims or deliberately fabricating information to cause demonstrable harm.
The state certainly has a responsibility to confront organised disinformation.
False information can damage reputations, trigger panic, facilitate fraud, inflame communal tensions and undermine public institutions. But the most effective response is not necessarily criminal prosecution.
The first line of defence should be credible information.
When government institutions provide timely, verifiable and accessible information, false narratives have less room to flourish. When official communication is slow, opaque or evasive, rumours naturally fill the vacuum.
Media literacy, independent fact-checking, greater transparency from digital platforms and rapid official responses can do much to counter misinformation without turning the state into the arbiter of acceptable opinion.
There is another fundamental problem with using the language of “anti-state propaganda”
. In a democracy, the state and the government are not synonymous. Criticism of a government, an institution or a policy cannot automatically be equated with hostility towards the country.
Indeed, robust criticism can be a form of public service.
The NCCIA must therefore resist the temptation to interpret dissent through a security lens. Its credibility will depend not on how many social-media accounts it monitors or how many people it summons, but on whether it can distinguish genuine cybercrime from lawful expression.
The agency has an opportunity to establish itself as a professional institution capable of protecting citizens in the digital age. It should use that opportunity wisely.
A cybercrime authority should be feared by fraudsters, extortionists, hackers and organised digital criminals — not by journalists, political critics and ordinary citizens exercising their right to speak.
If the NCCIA wants the public to trust its new cyber-patrolling regime, transparency, legal clarity and independent oversight are not optional. They are essential.
The fight against disinformation cannot be won by weakening public confidence in the very institutions claiming to protect the public.
Trust, rather than surveillance, should be the foundation of Pakistan’s response to fake news.
